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One of the most important functions of corporate management is the 
allocation of scarce resources . Typically, management has limited 
sources of capital and must decide upon funding competing projects. The 
proper and appropri ate analysis of the economi c characteristics of 
prospective ventures is one of the most critical areas of any company's 
operations; the company will prosper or fail on the basis of its evalua-
tion of investment opportunities and the results of its decisions. 
The allocation of capital resources by petroleum companies for oil 
exploration illustrates this decision process. Oil exploration ventures 
are characterized by large investment outlays, long lead times to project 
completion, and long periods of project output and payout. These charac-
teristics make oil exploration ventures especially sensitive to uncer-
tainty. Indeed the current environment in the petroleum industry offers 
little certainty for those charged with all ocating scarce resources. A 
major unknown is the path of crude oil prices. While the changes in the 
wor l d oil market s between 1974 and 1982 have increased the wealth of al l 
oil exporting countries, the volatility of oil prices has increased the 
uncertainty associated with the future income of t hese countries and the 
investor companies. 
i ncompl et e sharing 
In addition, these characteristics are coupled with 
of information and technology which l eads to 
significant differences in the ab ility and inclination of the various 
parties to bear the ris ks invo lved. Uncertainty concerning the s haring 
of project risk and return creates a potential for disagreement between 
the host country and the potential investor company . As a result , 
projects that are economically attractive in aggregate terms become 
unattractive to one or both parties. Hence, the structure and 
application of petroleum contract terms between host countries and 
foreign companies have major implications for the viability of oil 
devel opment projects . 
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the terms and 
conditions of petroleum exploration contracts on the evaluation of oil 
exploration opportunities. 
develop the analysis are 
The contract terms and conditions used to 
from selected Pacific Rim countries. As a 
group these countries offer the potenti a 1 investor a host of investment 
options. The terms and conditions include, but are not limited to, the 
required investment, cost recovery, production splits and tax r ates. 
These factors typically differ from country to country and have a direct 
bearing on a project ' s cash flow. The i mpact of these contract terms on 
t he variability of cash flow is the main focus of this paper. Corporate 
management must then evaluate the economics of potential oil development 
projects, as well as other investment opportunities, in the light of 
overall corporate aims and goals. Very quickly what appears to be a 
rel atively defined exercise becomes complex. 
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Specifically, the objectives of this research are twofold: 
1) to compare and contrast the known f iscal terms for petroleum explo-
ration in Australia, Brunei, China, Indonesia, and Malaysia; and 
2) to evaluate the desirability, from the perspecti ve of the potential 
foreign investor, of several alternative contract structures, taking 
into account both economic and political considerations. The 
distribution of risk between the host country and the foreign 
contractor (investor) and the incentives for company behavior that 
are created under each type of contract are of particular 
importance. 
The first portion of the research design is a description of the relevant 
fiscal terms now offered for petroleum exploration i n the selected 
countries, i.e . , production splits, rate of tax, cost recovery, and 
royalty payments. The second part is the derivation of estimated cash 
flows from the application of contract terms of each country under 
different crude oil price scenarios. Finally, the estimated cash flows 
are the subject of an analysis to incorporate geological and f inanci al 
risk. The results of this analysis , will enable a potenti al investor to 
determine which of the countries offer the . mos t attractive terms for 
conducting petroleum exp loration. Th is analysis does not incorporate the 
special incentives offered by some host countries on a one time basis and 
implicitly assumes a standardized production cost/benefi t profile for 
each investment opportunity. Thus, al though this is a si mpli f ication of 
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actua l business arrangements, it should prove he l pful for those responsi -
ble for making investment decisions concerning oil exploration ventures. 
This paper is organized into five chapters. Chapter I is an introduction 
and overview of the process of deci sion making in petroleum investment 
situations. Chapter II provides a review of the literature relevant to 
the analys is of exploration strategies. Chapter III first outlines the 
contract te rms for petroleum investment; the chapter then explains the 
methodology employed to estimate the cash fl ows generated by oi l produc-
tion and the a 11 ocat ion of these cash flows between the parties to the 
contract. Chapter IV presents the results of the simulation . The 
conclusions and recommendations for further research are in Chapter V. 
PAGE 4 
CHAPTER II 
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE 
Investment in petroleum exploration is a high-risk economic activity. 
There is considerable uncertainty about costs, future prices, and ulti-
mately the ability to transfer wealth from any oil found in the ground. 
Therefore , good economic analysis is especially difficult but valuable . 
It includes both capital budgeting estimates and sophisticated management 
experience, common sense, and intuition. The analysis must go beyond 
esti mations made for a single project and be subject to careful scrutiny 
across several projects. Thus the single project is evaluated across a 
wide range of investment opportunities. 
Over the years many different criteria and techniques have been used for 
making such decisions; and new methods and philosophies are being intro-
duced almost daily .1 Early economists used methods such as book rate of 
return, debt vs. equity ratios, and payout. Practicing managers differ, 
too, in t he app 1 i cat ion of various techniques and criteria used in 
analysis. 
1r. Field Roebuck, Economic Analysis of Petroleum Ventures, SEC 
Exploration, I nc. (Oklahoma City , OK 1979), p. 5. 
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A study by Dean concludes that executi ves , by and large, show widespread 
failure to measure the investment worth of individual proposals directly; 
lack defensible, objective standards for acceptability of an investment; 
and have distorted dedication to procedures and paper work, with 
inadequate understanding of the economic content of the concepts used. 2 
He then describes the severa 1 ways management can go about economic 
analysis. He builds a strong case for the discounted cash flow method 
based upon the following principles: 
1) is economically realistic in confining the analysis to cash 
flows and forgetting about customary book allocation. 
2) forces guided thinki ng about the whole life of the project and 
concentration on the lifetime earnings. 
3) weights the time pattern of the investment outlay and the cash 
earnings from that outlay in such a way as to reflect rea l and 
important differences in the value of near and distant cash 
flows. 
2Joel Dean, 11 Measuring the Productivity of Capital, Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 33 No. 1, January 1954. 
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Simple as these concepts may seem, they were not widely applied in the 
oil industry until the late 1950s. 3 Du r ing the post-World War II 
drilling boom, oil companies were producing some 20 percent net returns 
on net shareholder investment; money was available at 3 and 4 percent 
interest rates; and in general, management did not feel a compelling need 
for highly refined profitability criteria. It was in the early 1960s the 
oil industry began to accept the principles laid out in Dean's paper. 
The emerging emphasis at that time, and still largely in practice today, 
s uggests that cash flow, di s counted at the cost of capital, is still the 
most rel iable criterion. 
A problem of discounted cash flow is the question of how to measure the 
"cost of capital." Modi gliani and Miller state that "average cost of 
capital to any firm is completely independent of its capital structure 
and is equal to the capitalizat ion rate of a pure equity stream of its 
class. ,A Other scholars have argued the cost of capital is the weighted 
average of the cost of each type of capital - common stocks, senior 
securities and loans. 5 
3Michael Sil bergh and Folkert Brans, J . " Profitability Analysi s -
Where Are We Now?", Journal of Petroleum Technology, Vol. 24, No . 1, 
January 1972. 
4Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, "The Cost of Capital, 
Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment, 11 American Economic 
Review, June 1958, p. 275 . 
5Ibid., p. 267. 
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In spite of this controversy, the discounted cash fl ow rate of return 
approach is widely used in practice today. On a practical basis one must 
overcome the theoretical hurdles. Given t hat the cost of capi tal cannot 
be measured precisely, the discount rate chosen as best representing the 
cost of capital would, within the limits of accuracy, generate a similar 
result using either basis for the cost of capital. 
The i nterna 1 rate of return method is another tool to evaluate a pro-
jects 1 worth, although it has limitations. The best applications appear 
in those cases where there is one investment that is made at the begin-
ning, and there is only one apparent solution, i.e., one rate of return. 6 
This approach is complicated where there are several alternate periods of 
investments and profits, or there appear to be several solutions (rates 
of return). The i nterna 1 rate of return may be defined as the rate of 
interest that will reduce the future net incomes so that the sum of their 
present values equals the initial investment. 
0 = -c + --~1 ___ + ---~f ___ _ 
(l+i)" 5 (l+i)l+.S 
This may be written as : 
---~D---­
( l +i )N-. 5 
6Arthur W. McCray, Petroleum Evaluation and Economic Decisions, 
Prentice-Hall , Inc. , New Jersey, p. 28. 
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where: 
C = initial investment , dol lars 
s1 = net cash flow, considered to be spread through the first year 
i = interest rate, per year. 
A study of expl oration choice necessarily includes an analysis of risk. 
According to modern finance theory, riskiness of an investment from t he 
perspective of a specific investor depends on two things: the riskiness 
of the investment when viewed by itself, and the extent to which this 
risk can be diversified away in the investor's portfolio. The fo rmer 
will be the same for all i nves tors, but the latter may vary significantly 
among investors. The extent to wh ich project specific risks can be 
diversified depends on how many of an investor's dollars are applied to a 
single project. Risk analysis with specific reference to the petroleum 
industry is also discussed in the l iterature . 
Cozzolino explains the primary risk of exploration is dry hole risk and a 
secondary risk is one of finding non-commercial quantities of oil. 7 
Systematic risk is illustrated by changes in oil prices wh ich may affect 
all units of business in the same way at the same time . Risk diversifi-
cation in exp loration reduces the possibility of a significant l evel of 
loss. The method of risk diversification in exploration is participation 
7 Jane M. Cozzolino, 11 Exp l or at ion Risk Management, 11 Exp l oration and 
Economics of the Petroleum Industry , Matthew Bender , New York, 1981, 
p. 54- 64. 
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in many projects such that risk is spread over a number of proj ects each 
with its own level of risk. 
Ramsey noted that a firm's objective function is the maximization of its 
expected net present discounted va 1 ue of its futu re income stream; in 
short, maxi mization of net worth. 8 This is standard in the finance 
literature. He approaches the evaluation of a series of projects using a 
thorough analysis of risk and the probability of ruin. Ramsey further 
recognizes that risk affects the decisions of even very large firms since 
even large firms do not have unlimited resources of risk capital. 
Arps and Arps argue that the prudent risk-taking approach is a combina-
tion of two concepts. 9 The first concept is that successive risk-taking 
ventures should be undertaken only in such a manner that the risk money 
in each venture is 1 ess than the amount that wo uld create a 11 break-even11 
situation in the long run. This approach assumes that an investor would 
continue to invest risk money to the extent he had been successful in 
prior ventures. Thi s break-even concept was ori gi na lly defined by 
Wh itworth and first applied to exploration ventures by Hayward. 10 
8James B. Ramsey, "Some of the Policy Implications of the Economics 
of Exploration," Contemporary Studies in Economic and Financial Analysis, 
Vol. 26, JAI Press, Greenwood, Conn., 1982, p. 159-172. 
9J. J. Arps and J. L. Arps, 11 Prudent Risk Taking, 11 Journal of 
Petroleum Technology , Vol. 26, No. 7, 1974. 
10w. A. Whitworth: Choice and Chance, B. E. Stechert, New York, 
1965 and J. T. Howard: 11 Probabilities and Wildcats, 11 Drilli ng and 
Production Practices, API (1934) 11, p. 167-175. 
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Hayward argued that based on probability analysis there was an uppe r 
limit on the amount to be invested in any one opportunity. 
The second concept proposed by Arps a nd Arps is that the amount of money 
risked on any one venture should not exceed the amount that would 
increase the risk of 11 gambler's ru ins" beyond acceptable limits. 11 
"Gambler's ruin" is defined as a situation in which a risk-taker with 
limited funds goes broke through a continuous string of failures that 
exhausts his or her available funds. 
A study by Blitzer concludes that, like any other investment, the drill-
ing for oil and gas has its share of " systematic risk" and 
"project-specific" risk. 12 For example, an investment in drilling for 
petroleum has an expected rate of return that is dependent on the value 
of the oil fo und. This value depends on the number of recoverable 
barrels found, the cost of extracting those barrels, and the world market 
price at which they can be sol d. The quantity of oil in the ground is 
primarily a geological phenomenon and is a "project-specific" risk. 
In summary, investment in oil exploration and devel opment involves 
significant risks. As stated above, at the exploration stage there is 
11Arps and Arps, p. 5. 
12charles R. Blitzer, Donald R. Lessard, and James L. Paddock, "Risk 
Bearing and the Cho ice of Contract Forms fo r Oil Explorati on and Develop-
ment," The Energy Journal, Oelgeschl ager, Gunn & Hain, July 1984, p. 6. 
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great uncertainty concerning geological factors (e.g. reserves, flow 
rates), eventual development and operating costs, and revenues (oil 
prices). 
In addition to uncertain ret urns and significant risks for each oil 
explorat ion project, there exists the complication of negotiating a 
contract between the investor company and the host country. The contract 
terms allocate the risks and returns between the two parties. When 
deciding who should bear a greater proportion of the returns and of each 
risk, it is necessary to consider whether either party has a comparative 
advantage in risk bearing. This comparative advantage depends on how 
large an exposure each party has to each type of risk and the ability to 
diversify that risk. A host government must decide what contract terms 
will attract the international oil community given the geological signif-
icance of a country and yet generate the most revenue for the country. 
The direct relationship between the contract te rms and the attractiveness 





This study begi ns with a general description of the various types of 
exp loration contracts found in use today and t hen proceeds with the 
specific forms of contractual relati onships in sel ected Paci fic Rim 
countries. The five countries of the study are: Australi a , Brunei, 
Chi na , Indo nesia, and Malaysia. From this background the tools of 
fi nanc ial analysis are used to evaluate the contractual relationship. 
In order to form a basis of evaluation, a hypothetical investment and 
production scheme is established . The terms and conditions of explora-
tion contracts typi cal for each country are applied to the hypothetical 
investment and production scheme. This procedure generates the projected 
cash flows f or each country. In addition, the model is applied for three 
alternative crude oi 1 price scenarios: $35. 00, $25. 00 and $20. 00 per 
barrel, respectively. The estimated project cash flows for each country 
and each scenario are then discounted at fifteen percent. Fifteen 
percent is chosen as representative of the cost of capital. The cost of 
capital, expressed as an annual percentage , is a firm's weighted average 
cost of the various types of fu nds it obtains. It is not assumed that an 
indivi dual project is financed wi th all debt or all equity . Rather, each 
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project should be considered to be financed with debt and equity in 
proportion identical to the firm's capital structure. In addition, the 
i nterna 1 rate of return is calcul ated for the samp 1 e for each scenario 
for each country. Requiring that the return on a project be at 1 east 
equal to the cost of capital is equivalent to requiri ng that a project 
not reduce the company's value. These rates of returns can be evaluated 
for each country. Of greater importance, however, is the comparison of 
rates of return among the countries. An extension of the analys is is to 
evaluate the impact of contract changes which might be considered in each 
country in order to stimulate and enhance the attraction of foreign 
investment. Finally, we compute a project's internal rate of return. 
The final step in the analysis is to utilize the theories of Gambler's 
Ruin and expected value. Both of these applications are an attempt to 
establish an acceptable level of risk. Every company, large or small, 
must consider each investment not only on its own merit, but also on the 
basis of its potential effect on the financial health of the enterprise. 
A company must not expose itself unduly to the disastrous consequences of 
a series of failures. This is precisely the concept behind the theory of 
Gambler's Ruin. The theory of expected value implies that t he average 
value of all possible outcomes weighted on the basis of the respective 
probabilities. It should be noted that it is the average outcome (value) 
expected from a large number of ventures of the same type. 
Finally, the research calculates the minimum probability of success 
(maximum probability of failure) which makes a viable project. Naturally 
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the lower the minimum probability of success the better chance the 
project has in meeting i ts expected outcome. 
CONTRACT DESCRIPTION 
As stated above, the analysis begins with a general description of the 
var ious types of exp 1 oration contracts fou nd in use today and a more 
specific description of the type of exploration contract used by the five 
countries of this study .13 There are various types of contracts relating 
to exploration and production arrangements for oil and gas . Throughout 
the hi story of the oil industry no contract form has stood the test of 
time. None has been uniquely successful nor withs tood the pressure of 
changing circumstances of either party. Basically these may be 
subdivided into about fo ur broad categories as follows: Concessions, 
Joint Ventures, Production Sharing Arrangements, and Risk Service 
Agreements. 
Concession Agreements 
The concession agreement is the oldest form of exploration and production 
agreements. It originated in Iran in 1901. Basically, an oil concession 
is an agreement between t he host government on the one hand and a company 
or individual, the concessionaire, on the other. The concession agree-
13The description is drawn from an unpublished report, Phillips 
Petroleum Company, Bartlesville , Okl ahoma , 1980. 
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ment grants to the company, or i ndi vi dua 1 , the use of a territory for 
exploring, developing and trading of oi 1 in return for some payments, 
usually in the form of taxes, royalties, rentals, and bonuses. The early 
concessions were usually for long periods of time and granted the 
concessionaire wide latitude insofar as the rate of exploration and 
development, the marketing and pricing of oil, the importation of materi-
als, and the repatriation of profits. It was, in fact, a result of this 
wide latitude that host governments began to reevaluate the rights given 
to a concessionaire and began to develop other forms of agreements. 
Most recently the trend has been to devise more ornate tax systems 
all owi ng the host country to share in higher production. Various "wind-
fall profits 11 schemes are in force as means for a supplementary tax where 
profits exceed a certain limit. A rate of return is commonly used for 
determining such a limit. 
Joint Venture Agreement 
Joint venture agreements differ from concession agreements i n that they 
constitute the basis of a legal and economic partnership between the host 
government and the exploration company , with the government usually 
participating through a nationall y- owned oil company. The partic ipation 
is created through ownership of a facade company or via a joi nt structure 
arrangement between the national oil company and the exploring company. 
In addition to this participation, the host country also levies income 
taxes (usually 50 percent or more). Another significant difference , 
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which is of vital importance to the host government, is the fact that 
this arrangement does not alienate ownership of the minerals; that is, 
the producing company 1 s access to the mi nerals only occurs after the oil 
is produced and brought to the ground. 
Production Sharing Contract 
The production sharing contract was first popularized in Indonesia in the 
1960' s and has spread throughout the world as a major legal structure . 
This contract f orm provides that the contractor (oil company) will 
advance all the f unds for exploration, development and operating expenses 
and later recoup such costs out of its proportion of eventual production. 
Usually recoupment is restricted to a certain percentage each year, with 
the balance of production split between the producing company and govern-
ment oil company. Taxes are paid either by the contractor out of hi s 
production share or by the host government with the contractor receiving 
a split free and clear of a tax burden. 
Possible variations of the production sharing arrangement have led many 
countries to adopt t his form of agreement and to modify these terms to 
fit local situations . Terms which can be modified include the level of 
cost recovery (expressed as a percent) , allowable costs , acreage reli n-
quishment, rate of taxation and method of payment, production splits and 
bonuses, and management of operations. 
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Risk Service Contract 
The risk service contract resembles concession agreements and production 
sharing contracts in terms of duration, work obligations, etc. but 
differs in several important aspects. Its basic distinctive feature is 
that it pays the producing company in cash rather than oil, although it 
may have some provision permitting the company to buy back an amount of 
crude oil at an international market price. As with the production 
sharing contract, the contractor is granted no minerals or mineral rights 
and receives remuneration from the oi 1 actually 1 i fted and shared with 
the host government. 
CRITERIA FOR JUDGING THE DESIRABILITY OF CONTRACTS 
Each of the contract forms outlined above involves different ass ignments 
of return (net benefits) between the host country and the foreign con-
tractor under vario us outcomes defined by potential reserves, oil field 
development and operat ing costs, and world oil prices. Cl early the host 
country will want as large a share of returns as possible. But trade-
off s and concessions wi 11 occur because countr ies compete for foreign 
technology and risk capital. The contract types and terms differ among 
countries because the contract negotiated depends on the country's 
bargaining power and negotiating skill, as well as country-specific 
criteria for judging the desirability of various contract structures. 
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The focus for developing countries should be on the l atter issue, i.e., 
i dent ifyi ng efficient contract structures. A contract is defined as 
efficient if there is no way for one party to improve its position 
without making the other worse off. This movement toward contract 
efficiency is a nonzero sum process in which both parti es can gain or in 
wh ich one can ga in while the other does not lose. Improving contract 
efficiency from the country's vi ewpoint invol ves improving the country 1 s 
overall position because it is ass umed that the country can exploit its 
bargai ning positions . Hence, such a contract insures that the foreign 
(investor) company receives a share that is sufficient to attract its 
participation but does not rece ive all of the incremental revenue from a 
rise in oil prices. A rise in oil prices does not necessarily mean that 
all additional revenue will go to the contractor. There must be some 
flexibility in fiscal terms for a host country to share in the possib le 
windfall. 
From the viewpoint of a host country the efficiency of a particular 
contract depends on its specific circumstances, includi ng the extent to 
which it is exposed to related ris ks such as hard currency drain, its 
capacity to manage exploration and development, its ability to monitor 
contractors' performance, and its knowl edge of its own geological pros-
pects . These circumstances, in t urn, determine the country's comparative 
advantage vis-a-vis foreign suppliers of technology in ass um ing various 
responsibilities and risks and in negoti ating specific contracts. 
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Host countries and foreign contractors are likely to trade off particular 
risks and expected returns to see which party might have a comparative 
advantage in bearing those risks. For example, one party may be much 
more exposed to geologic or price risks than the other and, hence, be at 
a comparative disadvantage in absorbing that risk. In this case, both 
parties may imp rove their position by agreeing on an appropriate distr i-
bution of the risks between themselves. The same holds true for manage-
rial incentives , because foreign contractors are used, in part, to 
provide t echnology and experience that are in short supply in many 
foreign countries. This implies that the government is not in a position 
to fully specify all actions by the contractor. In such cases, the pr i me 
assurance t he government has that the project will be managed appropri-
ately is to structure a contract whereby it is in the contractor ' s own 
interest to manage the project as the gove r nment would manage it if it 
had comparable information and technical expertise. 
Finally, the reduction of contracting risks is of mutual advantage 
because such risks typically reduce t he total potential benefits of the 
project . Though the government might potentially gain from uni 1 atera l 
action in the future (expropriation), t he contract, recognizing the 
likelihood of such action , would demand compensat ion in the form of 
reduced investment or a higher promised share. The bottom line, however, 
seems to be that there i s really no choice but to come to an agreement 
given that the other default-means of financing oil development in less 
developed countries is by bank borrowing, primarily from World Bank 
sources , bank borrowing which attaches its own terms and conditions for 
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making a 1 oan, thereby taking an active ro 1 e in the management of the 




Oil exploration and production in Australia is conducted under concession 
agreements. The concess ion agreements differ between offshore and 
onshore areas. Offshore areas are controlled by the Petroleum (Submerged 
Lands) Act 1967, as amended and governed by Federal authorities. Onshore 
areas are controlled by the States and Territories on an individual 
basis. For the purpose of this study we will analyze the offshore fisca l 
terms . 
Offshore areas are normally put up for competitive bidding with the 
proviso that the company offering the most "cash money" up front is given 
the right to accept the offer of a Permit. The concession agreement then 
entered between the successful bi dder and the Commonwea lth of Australia 
provides for a 6 year exploration peri od wi th the rights of renewal for 
successive periods of 5 years each. The company is required to perform 
an exploratory work obligation in accordance with international petroleum 
industry practices . A small exploration f ee is attached to each block 
awarded. 
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The most unique development in Australia's licens ing framework has been 
the introduction and application of the resource rents tax (RRT). The 
RRT regime, appli ed to profits, is a most effi cient mechanism for deriv-
ing for the State an appropriate share of the large returns that can be 
associated wi th oil production. 
The RRT applies to offshore petroleum projects effective from July 1, 
1984. Since RRT is payab le on a 11 project11 basis all income and expendi-
tures derived by an entity are split into project and non-project. 
Income and expenditure are to be accounted for on a cash bas is. The 
actual or deemed proceeds from a sale of petroleum at the point of first 
marketabi 1 i ty is the primary assessab 1 e receipt and is reduced by the 
relevant exploration expenditure where it was incur red in rel ation to the 
origi nal exploration licence from which the specific production licence 
was created. Other capital and operating expenditures wh ich are directly 
attributable to the project are also eligible fo r deduction, i.e. , 
expenditures on plant or articles used in the extraction operations. 
Nondeductible amounts include interest payments and cash bid monies . 
In a fiscal year in which the resultant cash flow of the particular 
project is negative, the resulting deficit will be compounded by a 
threshold rate (long term bond rat e plus 15 percentage points) of approx-
imately 29%. This is also applied to the second year's cash flow if it 
too is negative . In the circumstances in which the net cash flow in a 
year (after deducting a prior year ' s compounded deficit) is positive the 
applicabl e rate to calcul ate the tax payable is 40%. The amount of RRT 
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payable for the year of income will be an all owable deduction for corpo-
rate income tax purposes in that same year. Accordingly corporate income 
tax will be less than otherwise as a result of the RRT. The corporate 
tax rate is 50%. 
Brunei 
Oil exploration and production i n Brunei is governed by the Petroleum 
Mining Enactment of 1963, the Petroleum Mining (Amendment) Enactment of 
1969, and the Income Tax Petroleum (Amendment) Enactment of 1969 (as 
amended in 1982). 
In its purest fo rm, this legislation is representative of the concession 
form of agreement. The investing company is required to commit to a 
minimum exploration expenditure during a specified of time normally about 
8 years. If a discovery is made the company may retain 25% of the 
original area for development purposes , the balance reverts to the 
government. 
The government participates via a fixed royalty of 10% , payable in cash 
or kind, on the value of petroleum revenue at the wellhead. This is 
applied to both oil and natural gas. The value of petroleum revenue is 
determined on the basis of the average actual sales price less transpor-
tation expense . Contractor's revenue after payment of royal ty is subject 
to a corporate tax rate of 55%. 
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In addition the Government of Brunei has the right to participate up to 
50% in a commercial discovery. Generally, a commerci a 1 discovery is a 
discovery of oil capable of producing a reasonable rate of return. It is 
ass umed the Government would pay its proportionate share of exploratory 
costs associated with the di scovery. 
China 
Although oi l and gas exploration is not new in China, thi s country only 
opened her doors to foreign partici pation in 1979. 
Offshore oil exploration work is governed by the 1982 Petrol eum Regul a-
tions and is patterned after one or two model contracts associated with 
competitive bid rounds in 1982 and 1985 respectively. The bid rounds 
were open to industry participants in a 1979 geophysical survey. Poten-
tial bidders were required to bid a work program, production splits , and 
any special contributions . Tax matters are defined in the Foreign 
Enterprise Income Tax Act dated 21 February 1982. 
The contractual framework for conducting oil exploration and production 
operations in China is most akin to a production sharing form of agree-
ment . The foreign contractor generally bids a proposed work program over 
a predetermined area. This bid is judged on (1) the relative merit in 
terms of work whi ch wi 11 be conducted over the areas and (2) a set of 
producti on splits which is also biddable by a foreign contractor. The 
splits , based on levels of production, determine how "profit oil 11 is 
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shared with the Chinese. Up to fifty percent of the oi 1 revenue is 
all ocated to "cost oil" which allows the contractor to recover explora-
tion expenses associated with the commercial discovery of oil. The 
balance of the revenue stream, if any, is shared according to the profit 
splits bid by the contractor. 
The basic petroleum agreement includes a 12.5 percent governmental 
royalty plus a 5.0 perce nt Consolidated Industrial and Commercial Tax 
which comprise a 17.5 percent effective royalty on gross production. 
This amount is paid before profit splits. The effective tax rate is 50 
percent and is generally creditable for U.S. income tax purposes. 
Like most production sharing contracts, obligations fo r substantial 
training and technology transfer rest with the foreign contractor. 
Actual monetary costs are usually cost recoverable under the terms of the 
agreement . 
Indonesia 
The classic production sharing contract (PSC) was promulgated in 
Indonesia in early 1960s . Although slow to be accepted by other less 
deve 1 oped countries, this form of agreement is now accepted as a 1 ega l 
standard. 
The Indonesia model PSC provi des that a contractor wi ll provide all the 
capital, technology and manpower to conduct exploratory operati ons. The 
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exploration risk is borne entirely at contractor's sole risk, cost, and 
expense and is recovered out of 100% of available production in the event 
of a commercial discovery. The PSC fu rther requires t he contractor to 
furnish funds in foreign exchange for the performance of the work pro-
gram, including payment to foreign third parties who perform services as 
a contractor. 
In this production sharing arrangement, ownership of any petro leum 
discovered remains with the national oil company or the host country and 
the contractor does not acquire title to its share of the petroleum until 
the oil reaches the export point or a mutually agreed delivery point. 
The effective tax rate is 48 percent and is valued on the Government 
Schedule of Price (GSP), currently set at $29. 00 per barrel (1984). A 
net realized price f. o.b . Indonesia is used for valuation of crude oil 
taken by contractor. The production split is 71/29 in favor of 
Pertamina, the Indonesia Government state oil company. A most recent 
improvement is the investment credit (or up-lift) which allows cost 
recovery of 120% instead of the usual 100%. 
Malaysia 
The Malaysian PSC closely resembles the Indonesia model PSC, al though the 
Malaysia model generally follows more stri ngent fiscal regime. 
The limit on the amount of cost recovery i n Malaysian PSC is 20-30 
percent as compared to 100 percent in Indonesia. Also, the split on 
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production is 70/30 in favor of t he government. Net revenues are subject 
to a 45 percent income tax. There is a remittance tax of 25 percent and 
a flat 10 percent royalty. An additional fiscal burden is a 70 percent 
11 excess profits 11 tax over a base price which is payabl e to Petronas , the 
Malaysian state oil company . The base price was initially $12. 72 per 
barrel, increasing 5 percent per annum. 
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The hypothetical investment and production scheme used for the financial 
analysis is as follows: 
The prospect is located in water depths of approximate ly 200 feet . 
Success f ul explorati on (1988) incl udes 1200 kilometers of seismic acqui-
sition, two exploratory wells and delineation drilling. Es t imated gross 
reserves of 200 mill i on barrels have been assumed for this case. Total 
gross estimated exploration and development cost is estimated to be 
$455 . 5 million. The development program (1988-1991) includes installa-
tion of one combination drilling/production platform, two protector 
platforms, processing equipment, and offshore (onshore) storage and 
loading f ac ilities. Development drilling includes drilling 48 we lls (10 
dry ho 1 es). Production commences in 1992 and peaks at 65, 000 barre 1 s of 
oil per day in 1995; and declining approxi mately 5,000 barrels of oil per 
day over a twenty year field l ife . 
The projected va 1 ue of the oil is $35. 00 per barre 1 in 1992 in the high 
price scenario, $25.00 in the most likely case and $20.00 per barrel in 
the low price scenario case. The price of oil is assumed to increase at 
5 percent per year beginning with production in 1992. The investment 
requirements for the project are: 
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$MM 
1987 Geological and Geophysical 2.0 
1988 Exploratory Wells 8.5 
1988-87 Delineation Drilling (4 wells) 25.0 
1989-1991 Development Producers (40) 175.0 
1989-1991 Development Dry Holes 30 . 0 
1991-1992 Platforms/Engineering Design 110. 0 
1990-1992 Storage and Loading Facilities 50.0 
1992 Process ing Equipment 55.0 
455 .5 MM 
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CHAPTER IV 
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
COUNTRY ANALYSIS 
The resu lts of the fina ncial analysis of different contract forms are 
s ummarized in Table 2. The table shows for each country under each 
scenario the i nternal rate of return, the net present value of the cash 
flows, and undiscounted cash flow amounts. The study clearly demon-
strates Australia off ers the highest return to the foreign contractor 
providing an internal rate of return (IRR) of 41.41 percent and a cash 
fl ow discounted at 15 percent of $515. 3 mi 11 ion based on a crude oil 
price of $35. 00 and production commencing in 1992. The second highest 
return is offered by China with an IRR of 38.6 percent and a cash flow 
discounted at 15 percent of $494.9 million. Brunei follows in third 
place offering a n IRR of 31.41 percent a nd a cash flow discounted at 15 
percent of $106.0 million . Indonesia and Malaysia offer remarkably l ower 
results. 
Next the study closely examines the results on a per country basis which 
will clearly demonstrate the effect of lower oil prices on the internal 
rate of return and the present value of the discounted cash flows. More 
importantly the study demonstrat es the variation of financial results 




Oil Price IRR Present Value Cash Fl ow 
(percent) $MM $MM 
Australia* $35.00 41. 41 $515.328 3118. 013 
II 25.00 33.88 312.098 2104.039 
II 20.00 28.84 206.847 1588.761 
Brunei 35.00 31.41 106 . 090 754. 400 
II 25.00 24.96 55.488 499 . 600 
II 20 .00 20 . 95 30.160 372.000 
China 35.00 38.6 494.9 3624.3 
II 25.00 31. 5 301. 9 2508.7 
II 20 . 00 27.0 204.3 1950.9 
Indo 35.00 20.5 73.226 996.988 
II 25. 00 16 . 14 13 . 761 693.736 
II 20 . 00 13. 51 -17. 059 538.764 
Malaysia 35.00 14.41 -7 . 553 709.299 
II 25.00 9.61 -61. 487 402.800 
II 20.00 6.26 -90.590 235.100 
*Australia 35.00 28.86 182.518 1342.798 
(resource rents tax) 25.00 20.55 64. 817 849.199 
20.00 16.75 18. 911 634. 799 
PAGE 32 
Three separate analyses have been generated for each country. The cases 
have been analyzed by varying the price received for crude oi 1, thus 
changing the overall gross revenue stream and ultimately, the IRR and the 
discounted cash flow amount. The crude oil prices are $35.00 in the high 
case; $25.00 in a most likely case, and $20.00 as a low price scenario. 
The discussion begins with the results for Australia. 
Australia 
The concession terms offered in Australia offer very attractive returns 
to a potential investor. Positive net cash flows beginning in the year 
of production (1992) remain favorable throughout project life, although 
the order of magnitude drops depending on the crude oil price (gross 
revenue). The absence of government participation is a stabilizing 
factor on the bottom line results. 
The discounted cash flows have been calculated at various discount rates, 
and the internal rates of return are shown below in Table 3: 
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Alternative Oil Prices: 





















IRR = 41.41% IRR = 33. 88% 






IRR = 28. 84% 
Consideration of the effects of the resource rents tax, imposed on a net 
profits basis, demonstrates a dramatic reduction in the contractor 's cash 
flow. The net present value of the cash flows and the internal rate of 
return are shown i n Table 4. 
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Alternative Oil Prices: 
Di scount Rate% 
0.0 
5.0 






(After Resource Rents Tax) 
Cash Fl ow , $MM 
$35.00 $25.00 
1342.79 849.199 
698. 98 403.62 
363.79 180.27 
182.52 64.81 
82 . 03 4. 49 







IRR= 16 . 75% 
The financial results for China show strong contractor cash flows and 
hi gh internal rates of return . These results are summarized in Table 5: 
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Alternative Oil Prices: 








Cash Flow, $MM 










608. 0 444.0 
301. 8 204.3 
141. 4 80.8 
IRR = 31. 5% IRR= 27.0% 
These results are strong considering t he state oil company has a right to 
begin paying its 51 percent of future costs at the ti me of deve l oprnent 
project. In effect these numbers have been reduced in half due to this 
factor. One feature of the China contract provides for competitive 
bidding of production splits or so-called x-factors . These x-factors are 
the amount of oil remaining for the contractor after taxes, royalty, and 
recovery of costs. The analysis assumes 100 percent x-factors . 
Brunei 
The concession agreement terms in Brunei offer a potential investor 
promising economic returns. In the high case, t he i nterna 1 rate of 
return is 31.41 percent which is only slightly lower than China 1 s 38.6. 
As expected, cash flow is negative until production commences in 1992 but 
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holds steady thereafter depending on production rates. Tabl e 6 provides 
a summary of the economic analysi s: 
Table 6 
Brunei Summary 
Cash Flow, $MM 
Alternative Oil Prices: $35.00 $25.00 $20.00 
Discount Rate % 
0 $754.398 $499.6 $371.99 
5 390.929 249.8 178.6 
10 205.364 122.5 81. 0 
15 106. 090 55.5 30.16 
20 51.278 19.4 3. 39 --
IRR= 31. 44% IRR= 25.0% IRR= 21.0% 
A 1 though the i nterna 1 rates of returns are accept ab 1 e, the discounted 
cash flows are considerably l ess than Australia or China. This is due, 
in part, to the government 1 s back-in rights at the point of commercial 
discovery. Obviously this reduces the cash flow available to the foreign 
contractor. More will be said about the trade-offs between cash flow and 
internal rate of return in the next chapter. 
Indonesia 
In the high oil price case ($35.00) the Indonesian model terms offer t he 
potenti al investor an internal rate of return of 20.5 percent and a cash 
flow discounted at 15 percent of $73.226 million. The low oil price case 
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($20. 00) demonstrates a fa 11 in the i nterna 1 rate of return to 13. 51 
percent and a negative discounted cash f1 ow. A brief summary of the 
results are shown in Table 7 below: 





























IRR = 13. 51% 
Positive factors in the Indonesian model contract include: 1) the full 
recovery of costs before profit oil is subject to production sharing and 
2) the absence of government equity participation. Negative factors 
affecting cash flow are relatively high before tax profit split in favor 
of the government and an obligation to supply a pro-rata share of oil to 
the domestic market at the rate of $.20 per barrel. 
Malaysia 
The contract terms in Malaysia offer a potential investor the lowest 
predicted economic returns compared to the other four countries analyzed. 
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In the hi gh price case, an internal rate of return equal to 14.41 percent 
is estimated; however , the cash f l ow discounted at fifteen percent is a 
negat i ve $7.553 million. This is due primarily to a limitation on cost 
recovery in the early years and hi gh government share throughout the life 
of the project . Table 8 depicts the results: 
Alternative Oil Prices: 
















IRR = 14. 41% 






IRR = 9. 61% IRR= 6.26% 
The above discussion presents the estimates of cash flows discounted at 
various discount rates and the i nter na 1 rate of return from the set of 
cash flows generated for each country i n the study. It is important to 
analyze the relationship, if any, between the various projects and, in 
particular to, determine what projects would most likely receive funding 
given capi tal rationing. 
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A simplisti c approach to this analysis appears in Figure I. 
Figure I 
Present Value 
(15% Discount Factor) 





















50 @ Brunei 
* Ind nesia 
0 # Brunei 
3 6 9 12 15 18 21 24 27 30 33 36 39 42 45 IRR 
Malays i a @ # Indonesia 
50 




Oi l Price = $35.00 - @ 
Oil Price= $25. 00 - * 
Oil Price = $20.00 - # 
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35.00, 25.00, 20.00 
35.00, 25.00, 20.00 
35.00 
If the $100 mm discounted cash flow constraint was dropped, for examp le , 
to $50 million, then Indonesia in the high case scenario and Brunei in 
the most likely price scenario would receive funding. The linear rela-
tionship between the results in each price scenario s hould be noted since 
cas h flow is di rectly re l ated to oil price (revenue). 
RISK ANALYSIS 
The term risk is well defined but al most universally misused. Risk is 
actually associated with and defined by the dispersion of the possible 
outcomes; that is, risk is a measure of the degree of uncertainty and 
does not necessarily reflect a high probability of a bad outcome . Of all 
the decisi ons that bus i ness executives must make, no ne is more challeng-
ing than choosing among capital investment opportunities. What comp li-
cates this problem is defining the assumptions and their i mpact on 
project economics . Each ass umption offers its own degree of uncertainty; 
and , taken together, these combined uncertainties can multiply into a 
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total risk of critical proportions. The evaluation of risk is difficult . 
The analys i s that follows applies the t heories of expected value, break-
even analysis, and Gambler's Ruin to better incorporate risk analysis in 
the decision maki ng process. 
Consider the choi ce between two investment alternatives, e. g., Australia 
and China, and the risk factor. In the $35.00 per barrel case both the 
IRR and the net present value are roughly equal for the countr ies. The 
analysis thus far has assumed no differences in geological ris k. Suppose 
the geo 1 ogi ca 1 certainty was not equa 1 and China had a s 1 i ght ly better 




Outcome Probabilit~ Extension 
MM$ MM$ 
Cash Flow 
Failure: -200 .75 -150 
-400 . 25 -100 
EVf -250 
Success: 100 .20 20 
200 . 30 60 
500 . 50 250 
EV s 330 
Failure: -250 . 70 -175 
Success: 330 .30 99 
EV = -76 
Australia 
Failure: -200 .80 -160 
-400 . 20 -80 
EVf -240 
Success: 100 . 30 30 
200 . 50 100 
500 .20 100 
EVS +230 
Failure: -240 .70 -168 
Success: 230 . 30 69 
EV = -99 MM 
Therefore, given different probability distributions, China is more 
attractive than Australia since the expected value is -76 MM in the case 
of China and -99 MM in the case of Australia. 
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Another test of acceptability is to calculate a minimum probability of 
success on the two projects. Given that 
Ps +Pf= 1.0 where P =probability of success 
and P~ = probability of failure 
and setting the expected value to zero 
EV= (Ps x S) + (Pf x F) = 0, 
one can solve for the minimum probability of success. Using China as an 
example, 
Solving for Ps 
330 PS - 250 + 250 PS= 0 
580 p = 250 
PS = 250 
s 580 
p = .43 s 
Thus , the minimum probability of success to obtain an expected present 
value cash flow of $330 MM is 43 percent in China. 
In the case of Australia, the same procedure demonstrates that the 
minimum probability of success necessary to obtain an expected present 
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value of $230 MM is 51 percent in Australia. 14 Given the choice between 
a minimum probability of success to ass ure prof i t ab ility in China of 43 
percent and 51 percent in Australia, the decision maker would choose an 
investment in China over the investment in Australia. 
RISK THEORY APPLICATION 
This paper previously discusses the concepts of Gambler 1 s Ruin and 
break-even analysis. With application of these basic approaches, it is 
possible to apply a conservative approach to a program of risk-oriented 
undertakings so that the probability of complete failure of such a 
program is reduced to manageable proportions. This paper presents such 
an approach as applied to oil and gas exploration in selected Pacific Rim 
countries . 
Gambler 1 s Ruin is described as a situation in which a risk- taker with 
limited funds goes broke through a continuous string of failures t hat 
exhausts his available funds. Therefore, the amount of money risked on 
any one venture should not exceed the amount that would exacerbate the 
risk of ruin beyond acceptable limits. 
14 Australia Example 
p = p = 1.0 
EV = (P x S) + 
o = (P 5C230) + 
Solvin~ for P , s 
(P x F) 
(l f _ p )(- 240) 
p = .51 s 
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Decision making in oil and gas ventures is concerned with risk-taking for 
high stakes and normally involves the following basic parameters: 
1. The amount of avai lable risk capital, C. 
2. Project risk money, or cost of failure, X. 
3. The potential reward or gain from success, R. 
4. The probability of success, Ps. 
5. The minimum probability of success, Pm . 
6. Probability of Gambler's Ruin, Pb. 
With unl imited funds available as risk capital: Pm= X/R. 
However, for limited funds, as is usual ly the case in exploration compa-
nies, a formula incorporating the cost of failure shoul d be applied in 
order to prevent the reality of 11 Gambler's Ruin." 
The Whitworth equation accurately describes this situation as follows: 15 
P (1-P ) 
[l + R/C) - (X-C)] s[l-(X/C)] s = 1 
The equation states that each time a venture is successful, the available 
funds, C, are increased by a factor of (l+R/C-X/C) and each time a 
venture is unsuccessful, the available funds are reduced by a factor of 
15Roebuck, pg. 145. 
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(1-X/C). The respective probabilities, Ps and 1-Ps, are indicated by the 
exponents, and the overall product must equal unity. 
From this and Pm = X/R, the minimum acceptab le probability of success: 
P = [l - ln [l + (R/C) - (X/C)])-l _ 16 m ln [l _ (X-C)] for break even. 
With the binomial theorem, the chance of Gambler 1 s Ruin is: 
p = (1-P )C/X 
b s 
where C/X = number of failures to deplete all the availabl e capital 
and, therefore , the minimum acceptable probability of success is: 
p = 1-(P )X/C 
m b 
The conservative risk-taking approach can also apply a simplistic break-
even analysis. This concept is that successive risk-taking ventures 
should be undertaken only in such a manner that the risk money in each 
venture is 1 ess than the amount t hat would create a 11 break even situa-
tion11 in the 1 ong run. 
16Ibid, pg . 146. 
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The most likely scenario confronting management is to determine where 
l imited avai l able funds, C, may prudently be invested in a venture that 
promises a reward, R, so that by repeating the operation each time on a 
scale proport i onate to the availabl e funds, the investor wi ll in the long 
r un break even. 
Using China as an example, let 
x = $ 560 
R = $3624 
c = $2000 
Assuming we are wi lling to bear a 25% chance (Pb) of Gambler ' s Ruin, and 
there is a 30% probability of success (Ps). 
X/C = 560/2000 = .28 
R/C = 3624/2000 = 1.812 
Break even: 
-1 
P = [l _ ln (1 + 1.812 - . 28)] = 1% m ln (1 - .28) .261 = 26. o 
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Gamb lers Ruin: 
p = 1 - ( 25)· 28 m . 
= 1 - . 678 
= 32.2% 
Therefore , the project is not acceptabl e since 32% is greater than the 
25% chance (Pb) of Gambler 1 s Ruin we are willing to assume. 
However, if the amount of risk capital (C) i s increased to 3000 then: 
X/C = 560/3000 = .1867 
R/C = 3624/3000 = 1.208 
Break even: 
p = [l _ ln(l + 1.208 - . 1867) ]-l 
m ln (1-.1867) 
= .226 = 22.6% 
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Gambler 1 s Ruin: 
p = 1 - ( 25)'1867 m • 
= 1 - .77 
= . 23 = 23% 
Therefore the project is acceptable on both counts. 
Alternatively, by application of the theory of Gambler's Ruin, invest-
ments in China would be acceptable provi ded a minimum of $2240 mill ion 
(C) is availabl e for risk· capi tal. The minimum amount of risk capital 
needed to support the level of risk is determined as follows : 
where R/C = 3624/2240 = 1.617 
p = [1-ln[l+(R/C)-(X/C)]]-l 
m l n [1-(X/C)] 
Break even: P = [l _ ln (l+l.617-.2)]-l m ln (1- . 2) 
= .20 = 20% 
Gambler 1 s Ruin: Pm= 1 - (.25)' 2 
1 - .75 
= . 25 = 25% 
Similar results are shown for Australi a and Brunei, both assuming the 
high price case scenario. 
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Australia X/C = 455/3000 = .1515 
R/C = 3118/3000 = 1.039 
Break even: P = [l- ln (1 + 1.039-.1517)]-l m ln (1-.1517) 
= .2057 = 20.57% 
Gambler 1 s Ruin: P = 1 - (.25).l5l7 
m 
Brunei 
= 1 - .81 
= .19 = 19% 
X/C = 116/3000 = .0386 
R/C = 754/3000 = .2513 
Break even: P = [l- ln (1 + .2513-.0386)]-l m ln (1-.0386) 
= .168 = 16.8% 
Gambler 1 s Ruin: Pm= 1 - (.25)" 0386 
= 1 - .947 
= . 053 = 5. 3% 
In conclusion investment in Brunei and Australia is profitable using 
break-even analysis and application of Gambler 1 s Ruin theory. 
If r i sk capital (C) were reduced to $580mm, investment in Brunei would 
stil l be acceptable on both counts . The demonstration of a reduction in 
risk capital is shown as follows: 
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where R/C = 754/580 = 1.3 
Break even: 
-1 
P = [l _ ln (1+1.3-.2)] 
m ln(l-.2) 
p = 23 = 23% m . 
Gambler 1 s Ruin: P = 1-( 25)" 2 m . 
= 1- . 75 
= .25 = 25% 
This analysis demonstr ates that since X, the cost of failure is low, the 
amount of risk capital, C, can also be low and still support the project 
above minimum economi c levels. 
As demonstrated in the foregoing examples , the amount of risk capital 
available to the decision maker has a very significant effect on the 
amount of risk money one can commit to a given project. The greater the 
risk capital, for a given probability of success, the greater t he degree 
of risk the decision maker can afford to take on a prospect. Finally, 
t his should put the small operator at a disadvantage with respect to a 
large one in that for t he same probability of success a large operator 




SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
This study demonstrates the vari ation in expected returns arising from 
the distinct terms and conditions offered for petroleum exploration in 
five Pacific Rim countries. Although the results were not entirely 
unexpected, the magnitude of the variation of the expected discounted net 
present value cash flows and the internal rates of return were dramatic. 
The high oil price case ($35. 00) res ulted in a maximum di scounted cash 
flow of $515 million in Australia to a minimum of a $-7.553 million in 
Malaysia. Internal rates of return vary from a high of 41 percent to a 
low of 14 percent. The low oil price case ($20.00) resulted in a maximum 
discounted cash flow of $206 million in Australia to a mi ni mum of -90.59 
million in Malaysia. 
Based on this analysis, investments in Australia, China, and Brunei 
appear to be worth funding in the high oil price scenario. Less attrac-
tive are investments in Indonesia and Malaysia although one could possi-
bly argue in favor of funding a project in Indonesia in the high oil 
price case. 
To determine whether a project i s desirable, an indication of its 
expected future cash flows is needed in order to relate expected project 
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pe rformance to corporate goals and performance measures. This approach 
however , probably does not go far enough to determine specific funding 
cr i teria when projects of equal returns are compared . This dil emma 
forces one to consider risk. Expected present values based on geological 
and statistical averages can be utilized to determine an absolute 
pr iority. Definite1y one cannot judge the relatively merits of competing 
projects on internal rates of return only although this measure is a good 
starting point. 
Two constraints have been considered: (A) breaking even in the long run, 
and (B) avoiding Gambler's Ruin. This first constraint is an attempt to 
identify t he maximum amount that an inves tor with li mi ted funds may 
prudently invest in a project. The second constraint is based on a 
binomial theorem wh ich states that the chance of invest or going broke 
through a continuous string of fail ures. 
Finally, the analysis demonstrates the attractiveness of investments in 
Australia, China, and Brunei given our assumptions about risk 
(probability of success) and return. We have further derived the minimum 
amount of risk capital required to deliver a reasonable return in China 
and Brunei. 
Decision makers must come to grips wi th risk analysis. In additi on to 
geologic risk the decision maker must be aware of nonquantifiable risks 
that may impact project economics. Commercial and politi cal risk are t wo 
other types of risk which weigh in the decision making process. 
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Subjective opinions about these risks are their only real measures. 
Incorporation of these risks could be the subj ect of fu rther research . 
This paper has identified a workable process to evaluate projects compet-
ing for risk capital. The basic concepts of f undamental financial 
ana lysis have been appl ied . The key to i nformed decision making is 
evaluating all available information in a well understood process in 
order t hat one can communicate to others the outcome of the process as 
well as the process itself. 
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